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Abstract
Recent evidence that the opportunity cost of employment is pro cycli-
cal implies that existing models based around search frictions in the labour
market cannot match the large volatilities of unemployment and vacancies
observed in the data. In this paper, we incorporate insights from behav-
ioural economics into the search frictions framework. The resultant model
can match observed volatilities even if the opportunity cost is strongly pro
cyclical. The key mechanism in the model is that the pro-cyclicality of the
opportunity cost has a limited impact on the reference wage of workers;
this feeds through into a limited volatility of the wage and so to a large
unemployment volatility
Keywords: behavioural economics, search frictions, unemployment volatilty
JEL Classication: E23, E32, J23, J30, J64
1 Introduction
Search models, based around imperfect matching of unemployed workers to
open job vacancies, provide a widely used framework for the analysis of the
labour market, enabling insights that have guided developments in theory and
policy. However, it has proven di¢ cult for the models to explain the large
volatilities of unemployment and vacancies that are consistently observed in the
data. This "unemployment volatility puzzle" arises because wages are sensitive
to the business cycle in the search frictions model with Nash bargaining over
wages. As a result, productivity shocks, which drive the business cycle in these
models, lead to large changes in the wage; this reduces variability in the number
of job vacancies posted by rm, thus suppressing movements in unemployment.
corresponding author; c.i.martin@bath.ac.uk; Department of Economics, University of
Bath, Bath BA2 7AY UK. This research did not receive any specic grant from funding
agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-prot sectors.
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There are currently two main responses to the unemployment volatility puz-
zle in the literature. The rst changes the wage bargaining protocol from Nash
to an alternating o¤er strategic bargaining set-up that reduces the inuence of a
workers outside option on the wage (Hall and Milgrom 2008)1 . The second pro-
poses alternative calibrations of structural parameters within a Nash bargaining
framework to increase the elasticities of labour supply and vacancy posting with
respect to the wage (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008). These responses reduce
the importance of output and labour market tightness (the number of vacancies
per unemployed worker) in wage determination and increase the importance of
the opportunity cost of employment2 . This results in lower wage volatility and
hence greater volatility of unemployment if the opportunity cost of employment
is constant, as it is assumed to be in these models.
However, Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) have questioned this
assumption. They present evidence that the opportunity cost of employment is
in fact strongly procyclical. Since the opportunity cost of employment plays a
prominent role in wage-setting in the models of Hall and Milgrom (2008) and
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), this implies an increased volatility of the wage.
Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) argue that this implies that these
models cannot generate a large volatility of unemployment and vacancies. As
a result, existing explanations of the unemployment volatility puzzle are inad-
equate. We refer to this as the Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis critique.
Because wage bargaining is deeply embedded within the literature, the critique
applies to other responses to the unemployment volatility puzzle, including Pis-
sarides (2009), Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) and Hall (2017). Thus, the
debate on the unemployment volatility puzzle remains active and unresolved.
Currently, there is no model in the literature which can address the unem-
ployment volatility puzzle that is not vulnerable to the Chodorow-Reich and
Karabarbounis critique (henceforth, the C-R&K critique).
In this paper, we analyse a model that can address the volatility puzzle
while being immune to the C-R&K critique. We do this using an alternative
version of the search frictions model that incorporates insights from behavioural
economics. We argue that simulations of a calibrated version of this model are
able to match the observed volatility of unemployment and other moments of
the data, even if the opportunity cost of employment is highly procyclical. We
are not the rst to develop behavioural search models; other examples include
Danthine and Donaldson (1990), Danthine and Kurmann (2007, 2010), Eliaz
and Speigler (2013) and Kuang and Wang (2017). Our contribution is to argue
that this framework enables the derivation of models that are immune to the
C-R&K critique.
1Other approaches include Pissarides (2009), who introduces introduces xed vacancy costs
and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013), who analyse the e¤ect of search frictions in credit
as well as labour markets and Hall (2017), who argues that uctuations in discount rates are
a driving force in the labour market.
2This close relationship between the wage and the value of non-work concerns commenta-
tors such as Hornstein et al (2005), who refer to the "excessive sensitivity" of unemployment
to the opportunity cost of labour in some models.
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We develop a simple model with undirected search, identical workers and
rms and where the only source of volatility is a productivity shock. Output
depends on the amount of e¤ort exerted by workers. Wages are posted by rms;
if a worker accepts the o¤ered wage, they become employed and determine
the amount of e¤ort to expend. As we discuss in detail below, these modelling
choices are guided by empirical evidence that wage posting is at least as common
as wage bargaining (Hall and Kreuger, 2012, Brenzel et al, 2014), that worker
e¤ort is an important input to production (Fehr and Falk, 1999, Kreuger and
Mas, 2004, and Gneezy and List, 2006) and that e¤ort is a procyclical function
of the wage (Burda et al, 2016).
To derive the optimal supply of e¤ort from workers, we follow Williamson
(1985) and Hart and Moore (2008) by assuming that employment contracts
are incomplete and that workers have discretion over the amount of e¤ort they
exert3 ; see also Gneezy and List (2006) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2013). We
assume that workers dislike exerting e¤ort but gain utility from reciprocation;
workers respond to what they see as a generous wage o¤er by increasing e¤ort
and "punish" a low wage by reducing e¤ort. This reciprocity e¤ect is supported
by evidence discussed in Kahneman et al (1986), Bewley (1999) and Fehr et
al (2009). We also follow Fehr and Falk (1999), Brown et al (2004) and Della
Vigna and Pope (2018) in assuming that workers assess the wage o¤er of the
rm relative to a reference wage or "fair wage"4 . Using these assumptions, we
derive the optimal supply of e¤ort of workers, showing that this is a function of
the wage relative to the reference wage.
Firms know the optimal e¤ort function of workers and set the wage to balance
the positive impact of higher wages on output against the adverse e¤ect on the
wage bill. Optimal wage-setting is characterised by a version of the Solow (1979)
condition, modied to allow for search frictions in the labour market. The wage
o¤ered to workers is a function of the reference wage and the marginal cost
of hiring; this latter a¤ects wage-setting because of search frictions; a higher
cost of hiring leads the rm to increase the wage in order to induce increased
e¤ort, increasing output along the intensive margin. The relative weight on
the reference wage and hiring costs on the wage is a function of the elasticity
of e¤ort with respect to the wage. Della Vigna and Pope (2018) estimate this
elasticity and nd it is small; this implies that the reference wage has a powerful
e¤ect on the wage, whereas the impact of marginal hiring costs on the wage is
small. This implies that labour market conditions have little direct impact on
wage determination. As Hall and Milgrom (2008) point out, this is essential for
ensuring the low volatility of the wage across the business cycle that is required
if the model is to generate a large volatility of unemployment.
3Williamson (1985) argues that only minimum job performance can be enforced by an
employment contract and that workers have discretion concerning the amount of e¤ort they
exert.
4This captures an e¤ect highlighted by Eliaz and Spiegler (2013), who note "the labor
contracts inherent incompleteness forces employers to rely to some extent on workersintrinsic
motivation. When workers feel that they have been treated unfairly, their intrinsic motivation
is dampened and their output declines".
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The Behavioural Economics literature does not provide guidance on how
the reference wage varies across the business cycle. Therefore any choice of the
reference wage will be to some extent ad hoc. In order to reduce this ad hoc
element, we restrict our choice to measures of the reference wage that satisfy
two criteria: they must be model-based and must be consistent with empirical
evidence in Koenig et al (2017) that the reference wage has low volatility across
the business cycle. In doing so, we di¤er from the existing literature, which
mostly follows Danthine and Kurmann (2010), who express the reference wage
as a reduced form function of the lagged wage and other variables. Although
simple and intuitive, this formulation is ad hoc. As we explain in detail below,
we use the annuity value of unemployment as our measure of the reference wage.
This captures a workersexpectation of what their lifetime earnings would be
on an alternative career path in which they are currently unemployed. This
simple model-based measure has low volatility across the business cycle, so our
measure is consistent with the empirical evidence.
The mechanism through which this model generates unemployment volatility
is similar to that outlined by Hall (2005); rms respond to a positive productiv-
ity shock by posting more vacancies, leading to a fall in unemployment and an
increase in labour market tightness. The behavioural aspects of our model give
an additional element to this mechansim that amplies the impact of productiv-
ity shocks. This arises because the increase in labour market tightness implies
an increase in the job nding rate of unemployed workers. This increases the
annuity value of unemployment and so leads to a higher wage. Workers respond
to the higher wage by inceasing e¤ort, which increases the incentive for rms to
post vacancies. This argument relies on pro-cyclical movements in e¤ort. Evi-
dence for this is provided by Burda et al (2016), who show that e¤ort is higher
when the unemployment rate is lower.
In addition, the model is able to generate a large volatility of unemployment
since the response of wages to productivity shocks is small. Although a produc-
tivity shock will increase in the annuity value of unemployment and through
this increase the reference wage and thus the wage, this e¤ect is small. This
means that rms respond to productivity shocks by making large changes to
the level of vacancies they post. By doing so, they generate large movements of
unemployment across the business cycle.
The model is able to generate a large volatility of unemployment even if the
opportunity cost of employment is strongly procyclical; as a result, the model
is immune from the C-R&K critique. This is because cyclical movements in the
opportunity cost of employment have only a limited impact on the annuity value
of unemployment as transient shocks have only a limited impact on expected
lifetime earnings. Since the wage is mainly driven by the annuity value of
unemployment, this implies that changes in the opportunty cost of employment
have little e¤ect on the wage. The key aspect of this mechanism is supported by
evidence in Burda et al (2016), who nd only a small impact of unemployment
benets on e¤ort; this is consistent with a small impact of the opportunity cost
of employment on the reservation wage.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2) outlines
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our behavioural search frictions model. Section 3) presents simulations of the
model. Finally, section 4) summarises the paper and raises issues for subsequent
research.
2 A Behavioural Search Model
In this section we outline a simple behavioural search model. We use a discrete
time model of undirected search with identical workers and rms where the
only source of volatility is a productivity shock. After shocks are realised, hiring
occurs. Then the rm posts a wage; if the worker accepts this o¤er, they become
employed and determine the amount of e¤ort to expend. Production then occurs
followed by exogenous separation. If the worker does not accept the wage o¤er,
they are unemployed for the remainder of period and the rm has an unlled
vacancy.
2.1 Evidence on Wage-Setting and E¤ort
These modelling choices are guided by empirical evidence on how wages are
set in practice, the importance of e¤ort in production and on the factors that
underlie the workers choice of e¤ort. In this section, we briey review this
evidence. Hall and Kreuger (2012) note that there are two main approaches
to wage determination in search frictions models, wage posting, in which rms
make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to workers, and wage bargaining. They also note
that although wage posting is associated with models of directed search, "the
assumption of a posted wage in a model with random search would not be
unreasonable".
There are two studies of the incidence of di¤erent types of wage setting.
Hall and Kreuger (2012) study responses of 1400 workers to survey questions on
the circumstances in which they took their most recent job. In total, only 31%
of workers reported some type of wage bargaining. This proportion is larger
for professional and knowledge-based occupations. It is also larger for workers
engaged in on-the-job-search. Brenzel et al (2014) examine the responses of
over 9,000 rms to the recurrent German Job Vacancy Survey and nd similar
results. They nd that only 38% of rms report wage bargaining; this propor-
tion falls to 27% in industries covered by a collective wage agreement and to
32% when an unemployed worker is hired. Wage bargaining is much more likely
when the job opening requires an experienced and more highly skilled worker.
These studies reveal a good deal of diversity in wage-setting. But it is clear that
wage bargaining is not common in the type of hiring analysed by the standard
search frictions model: hiring to jobs where there is no di¤erence in productiv-
ity between workers and where newly-hired workers come from unemployment
rather than an alternative employer.
However, as Hall and Kreuger (2012) stress, evidence that wage posting is
more common than wage bargaining is not inconsistent with the alternating o¤er
bargaining protocol of Hall and Milgrom (2008) where the rst o¤er made in a
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negotiation, assumed to come from the rm, is always accepted. But evidence in
Galuµcák et al (2012) argues against alternating o¤er wage bargaining. Galuµcák
et al (2012) examine responses of Chief Executive O¢ cers or Human Resource
Managers of around 15,000 rms to a rm-level survey on wage- and price-setting
practices in 15 EU countries, conducted under the auspices of the European
Central Bank. They nd that wages o¤ered to newly-hired workers are more
strongly a¤ected by wages o¤ered within the rm than by wages on the wider
labour market (the relative weights on internal and external factors are roughly
4:1); similar evidence is found in Levine (1993) and other papers that examine
the role of internal and external factors in wage setting. This goes against
alternating o¤er bargaining, where the wage is driven by external factors.
With regard to e¤ort, Williamson (1985) and Hart and Moore (2008) argue
that employment contracts are inherently incomplete since only a minimum level
of job performance can be legally enforced. As a result, workers have discretion
over the amount of e¤ort they devote to the job. There is a large empirical
literature documenting the importance of these e¤ects (summarised in Della
Vigna, 2009, and Fehr, 2009). This includes laboratory-based studies such as
Fehr and Falk (1999), who nd wages above the competitive level alongside
reciprocal high levels of worker e¤ort, in an experimental labour market in which
rms cannot monitor e¤ort. Beyond the laboratory, Kreuger and Mas (2004)
document how attempts by major US tyre producers to reduce the wage were
perceived as unfair and led to a sharp reduction on the quality of output. Other
examples include Gneezy and List (2006), who nd that higher paid workers
input data into a library information system more rapidly and Cohn et al (2014)
who found that workers were productive in distributing free newspapers when
they perceived their wages as fair. Further support for the importance of the
role of e¤ort in production comes from outside the behavioural literature. A
number of studies have analysed the responses of rms to questions about the
determinants of wages using data derived from a series of surveys conducted at
di¤erent dates in a number of di¤erent countries. These include Blinder and
Choi (1990), Bewley (1999), Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Levine (1993)
for the US, Galuµcák et al (2012) for 15 EU countries, Millard and Tatomir
(2015) for the UK and Agell and Lundborg (2003) for Sweden. These studies
nd that rms consistently cite the adverse impact on the e¤ort of workers
as a primary reason for not reducing wages when their economic environment
deteriorates.
Finally, considering the determinants of e¤ort, this is often modelled as de-
pending on a workers perception of the fairness of the wage o¤ered by the rm,
where the fairness of a wage o¤er is evaluated relative to a workers reference
wage. The role of the reference wage was stressed by Kahnemann and Tversky
(1979), who relate this to the concept of reference dependent preferences (see
also Della Vigna, 2009). The relationship between e¤ort and fairness is moti-
vated by reciprocity; this idea was the basis of the "gift exchange" variant of
e¢ ciency wage theory proposed by Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990);
these e¤ects were introduced into the business cycle literature by Danthine and
Donaldson (1990). Reciprocity and reference wages were introduced to game
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theory by Rabin (1993), whose approach was used by Danthine and Kurmann
(2007) to derive a macroeconomic relationship between e¤ort and wages.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Workers
There is a continuum of identical workers on the unit interval5 . In period t a
worker is either employed or unemployed. The value function for an employed
worker is
Lt = wt   c(et) +R(et; wt) + 1
1 + r
Et[(1  )Lt+1 + Ut+1] (1)
The worker earns (and consumes) real wage wt; c(et) is the disutility of exerting
e¤ort and R(et; wt) is utility gained from reciprocity. The job match dissolves
at the end of the period with exogenous probability  . The value function for
an unemployed worker is
Ut = zt +
1
1 + r
Et[ft+1Lt+1 + (1  ft+1)Ut+1] (2)
where zt denotes the opportunity cost of employment, reecting unemployment
benets and the value of non-work activities. If unemployed, an individual nds
a job and is employed in the next period with endogenous probability ft.
2.2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of identical rms on the unit interval. Each rm can hire
up to one worker and produces an amount yt, where
yt = stet (3)
where st is a technology shock, et is the amount of e¤ort exerted by the worker
and  is a constant that ensures output equals unity in steady-state. We assume
st = e
"st where "st = 
s"st 1 + 
s
t and 
s
t is distributed as N(0; 
2
s). The value
function of a lled job is
Jt = yt   wt + 1
1 + r
Et[(1  )Jt+1 + Vt+1] (4)
where V is the value function of a vacant job, given by
Vt =   + 1
1 + r
Et[qt+1Jt+1 + (1  qt+1)Vt+1] (5)
Firms must pay a real cost of  to post a vacancy. Vacancies are then lled at
the start of the next period with probability q. We follow the timing convention
5The model developed in this section is similar to Martin and Wang (2018). The main
di¤ erence is the specication of the reference wage, which enables our model to address C-
R&K critique. In section 2.2.6, we discuss our previous paper and explain why it is unable to
generate a large unemployment volatility if the opportunity cost of employment is pro-cyclical.
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of Gertler et al (2015) and assume that new job matches become productive
immediately.
We assume free entry of rms, so Vt = 0. This implies that the value function
for vacancies simplies to
Jt = (1 + r)

qt
(6)
and so the value function for a lled job becomes
(1 + r)

qt
= yt   wt + (1  )Et 
qt+1
(7)
or
yt = wt + t (8)
where t = (1 + r)[ 1qt   1 1+rEt 1qt+1 ] is the marginal cost of hiring labour.
2.2.3 The Labour Market
The labour market is characterised by search frictions. Aggregate hiring is
determined by the matching function
ht = mu

t v
1 
t (9)
where h is the number of workers hired, u is unemployment and v are vacancies.
m and  are parameters characterising the matching function. unemployment
rate. Dening labour market tightness as
t =
vt
ut
(10)
the matching function can also be written as
ht = mut
1 
t (11)
The vacancy lling rate, the probability of a rm lling a vacancy, is
qt =
ht
vt
= m t (12)
while the job nding rate, the probability that an unemployed worker nds a
job is
ft =
ht
ut
= tqt (13)
2.2.4 Optimal E¤ort
A worker chooses e¤ort to maximse the value function in (1). The optimal level
of e¤ort is therefore
ce(et) = Re(et; wt) (14)
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We follow Rabin (1993) and Danthine and Kurmann (2007) by assuming that
R(et; wt) = g(wt)d(et) (15)
where g(wt) is the workers perception of the wage o¤er of the rm and d(et) is
the workers reciprocal response. We also assume c(et) =
!e1+'t
1+' , d(et) =
e1+t
1+
and g(wt) = (
wt wreft
w wref ), where
6 wreft is the reference wage and (w wref ) is the
di¤erential of the wage over the reference wage in steady-state. The specication
of g(wt) implies that workers perceive a wage o¤er that results in a larger wage
di¤erential than normal as generous; the specication of d(et) implies that they
will respond to this by supplying greater e¤ort. The optimal level of e¤ort is
therefore
et =
1

(
wt   wreft
w   wref )
 (16)
where  = ( ! )
 and  = 1'  . The parameters of this e¤ort function have
been estimated by Della Vigna and Pope (2018); we use these estimates below
in calibrating the model. Further supporting evidence for this e¤ort function
comes from the study of the amount of time spent on non-work while on the
job by Burda et al (2016). Using individual-level longitudinal data from the
American Time Use survey, linked to the Current Population Survey, they nd
that the amount of time spent on non-work is a decreasing function of the wage;
as more time spent on non-work implied less e¤ort, this is consistent with e¤ort
being an increasing function of the wage.
2.2.5 Wage Posting
The rm will choose the wage to maximise the value of a lled job, so
@Jt
@wt
= 0 (17)
The optimality condition is
stew;t = 1 (18)
where ew;t is the derivative of e¤ort with respect to the wage. In doing so, the
rm balances the positive impact of higher wages on output against the adverse
e¤ect on the wage bill. Using the production function, this implies the modied
Solow Condition (Solow, 1979)
"t =
wt
yt
(19)
where " is the elasticity of e¤ort with respect to the real wage. Using the optimal
e¤ort function, we obtain
wt =
1
1  w
ref
t +

1  t (20)
6This di¤ers from Danthine and Kurmann (2010), who assume c(et) =
e2t
2
, d(et) = e

t and
g(wt) = log(wt); our optimal e¤ort function is therefore di¤erent.
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The marginal cost of hiring enters this wage equation because of search frictions;
a higher cost of hiring leads the rm to increase the wage in order to induce
increased e¤ort, increasing output along the intensive margin. Cyclicality of
the wage arises from cyclicality in the reference wage and in marginal hiring
costs. As we discuss below, econometric evidence suggests that the value for
 is small. This implies that the reference wage has a powerful e¤ect on the
wage, whereas the impact of marginal hiring costs on the wage is small. Thus
although marginal hiring costs are highly volatile, this does not feed through
into wage volatility. Cyclicality of the wage therefore largely reects cyclicality
in the reference wage. A small value of sigma increases the importance of main
mechanism of the model, which is that, because of the e¤ort e¤ect, the wage is
linked to the reference wage. It also reduces the impact of labour market condi-
tions, reected in the marginal cost of hiring, on wage determination. As Hall
and Milgrom (2008) point out, this is essential for generating a mildly cyclical
wage. In their alternating o¤er bargaining model, Hall and Milgrom acheive
this by calibrating a very small probability that wage negotiations break down.
There is no evidence suggesting this calibration is plausible. In contrast, a small
e¤ort e¤ect is supported by recent evidence from the behavioural economics lit-
erature7 .
2.2.6 The Reference Wage
In order to complete the model, we need to specify the reference wage. The
Behavioural Economics literature does not provide guidance on how the refer-
ence wage varies across the business cycle. Therefore any choice will be to some
extent ad hoc. In order to reduce this ad hoc element, we choose to restrict our
choice to measures of the reference wages that satisfy two criteria: they must
be model-based and must be consistent with available empirical evidence. This
evidence comes from Koenig et al (2017), who analyse longitudinal individual-
level data on the lowest wage at which workers would take a job, based on data
from the British Household Panel Survey, covering 1991-2009, and the German
Socio-Economic Panel, covering 1984-2010. We follow Koenig et al (2017) in
interpreting this as being informative about the reference wage. Koenig et al
(2017) nd that the reference wage has a low volatility across the business cycle
and is less volatile than the wage8 .
Our decision to restrict our choice to model-based measures of the reference
wage distinguishes our model from the existing literature, where the reference
wage is often expressed as a reduced form function of previous values of the wage
and other variables. Danthine and Kurmann (2010) express the reference wage
as a function of productivity and the lagged real wage. Koening et al (2017)
7A low vaue of  implies that  is small relative to ', so the marginal disutility of e¤ort is
more responsive to increased e¤ort than is the marginal reciprocity response. In that sense,
the main mechanism underlying our model relies on a weak reciprocity e¤ect.
8This evidence is obtained for Germany and the UK. There is no equivalent evidence for
the US; the longitudinal data on job search analysed by Krueger and Mueller (2012, 2016)
does not span enough time to allow cyclicality of reservation wages to be investigated.
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express the reference wage as a function of the lagged wage and the unemploy-
ment rate9 . Although simple and intuitive, these formulations are vulnerable
to the objection that they are an ad hoc device for adding wage rigidity to the
model. Other models, eg Martin and Wang (2018), assume that the reference
wage is a function of the "fair wage", where this is modelled by assuming that
workers feel entitled to a share of the surplus from their current job match. This
gives a wage equation similar to that obtained with Nash bargaining between
worker and rm. Shocks to the opportunity cost of employment generate wage
volatility which reduces the rms incentive to post vacancies and so leads to a
smaller response of unemployment. As a result, models based on this approach
cannot match the observed volatility of unemployment.
For the reference wage, we use the annuity value of unemployment, given by
wreft =
r
1 + r
Ut (21)
This measure is simple and intuitive: it is a workers expectation of the value of
their lifetime earnings on an alternative career path in which they are currently
unemployed rather than employed. It satises our criteria since it is model-
based, reecting the value function of an unemployed worker and is consistent
with the empirical evidence in Koenig et al (2017) as it has a low volatility across
the business cycle, being less volatile than the wage. Our preferred measure is
equivalent to the reservation wage in steady-state but is less volatile across the
business cycle. The reservation wage is not a suitable measure of the reference
wage as it is highly volatile across the businesss cycle1011 .
9There are other possibilities. In an early contribution to the literature, Summers (1988)
assumes the reference wage reects the average earnings of employed and unemployed workers,
so wreft = utbt + (1   ut)wt. As Danthine and Donaldson (1990) argue, this specication
implies a highly volatile reference wage. Alternatively, one might adapt an equation for the
real wage used by, among others, Krause and Lubik (2007), Shimer (2010) and Gertler et al
(2016), who express the reference wage as wreft = (1 !)wNasht +!wt 1 where wNash is the
real wage implied by Nash wage bargaining. For large values of ! , this gives a low volatility
of the reference wage.
10This has been demonstrated using simulations of the theoretical standard search frictions
model by, eg, Koenig et al ( 2017); it can also be shown in the context of the model developed
in this paper.
11To explore the relationships between the annuity value of unemployment and the reser-
vation wage, we dene (wt   wreft ) = c(wt   wreft )   R(wt   wreft ) as the cost of exerting
e¤ort, net of the reciprocity e¤ect, where we have used (16) to express this as a function of
(wt  wreft ). We can then dene the reservation wage as the wage that satises Lt = Ut, and
so, from (1)
Ut = w
res
t   (wrest   wreft ) +
1
1 + r
Et[(1  )Lt+1 + Ut+1] (22)
Using this, the reservation wage can be expressed as the implicit equation
wrest =
r
1 + r
Ut   f1  
1 + r
Et(Lt+1   Ut+1) + 1
1 + r
(EtUt+1   Ut)g+ (wrest   wreft ) (23)
The reservation wage is the sum of three terms. The rst is our measure of the reference
wage, the annuity value of unemployment given by r
1+r
Ut; this has a low volatility across the
business cycle. By contrast, the second term is highly volatile across the business cycle and
11
With this reference wage, the wage o¤ered by rms to workers is
wt =
r
(1  )(1 + r)Ut +

1  t (24)
This wage o¤er is always accepted by workers since it exceeds the reference
wage12 . The wage equation has three important properties. First, the low
volatility of the reference wage implies that the wage has a low volatility. As
a result, as we discuss in the next section, the model is able able to generate a
large volatility of unemployment. Second, cyclical variation in the opportunity
cost of employment has little impact on the reference wage and thus has only a
small e¤ect on the wage. The limited impact of the opportunity cost of employ-
ment on the reservation wage is supported by evidence in Burda et al (2016),
who nd that the amount of time spent on non-work is not a¤ected by unem-
ployment benets. This is consistent with a small impact of the opportunity
cost of employment on the reservation wage, leading to a small impact of the
opportunity cost on e¤ort. Third, labour market conditions a¤ect the wage. A
rise in unemployment leads to a reduction in the reference wage and thus in the
wage. In this way, the model contains the same e¤ects as the existing literature
that models the reference wage as a more direct function of unemployment.
2.3 Unemployment Volatility
The mechanism through which this model generates unemployment volatility is
similar to Hall (2005). Consider a positive productivity shock. Firms respond
by posting more vacancies; this leads to a fall in unemployment and an increase
in labour market tightness. In response to a negative productivity shock, rms
post fewer vacancies, leading to a rise in unemployment and a fall in labour
market tightness. Through this mechanism, the model generates variations in
unemployment and vacancies across the business cycle.
We note that the behavioural aspects of our model introduce a renement
to this basic mechanism that amplies cyclical movements in unemployment.
The increase in labour market tightness increases the job nding rate, which in
turn increases the annuity value of unemployment. From (23), rms respond to
this, and to the increase in the marginal cost of hiring, by increasing the wage.
Since
wt   wreft =
r
(1  )(1 + r)Ut +

1  t (25)
this induces an increase in e¤ort. This increase in e¤ort increases the incentive
of rms to post vacancies and so the e¤ort e¤ect amplies cyclical movements
in unemployment. This mechanism is illustrated in section 3.2) below, where
we present impulse response functions based on simulations of our model. This
accounts for the unsuitability of the reservation wage as a measure of the reference wage. The
third term, (wrest   wreft ), also has a low business cycle volatility, since the small value for
 implies that the response of e¤ort to the wage is small
12Since it is optimal for rms to o¤er a wage that exceeds the reference wage, the Diamond
Paradox is not applicable in this case.
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argument relies on pro-cyclical movements in e¤ort. This is supported by esti-
mates in Burda et al (2016) showing that non-work is higher when the unem-
ployment rate is higher and hence that e¤ort is pro-cyclical. Production function
based empirical studies of productivity, eg Basu and Fernand (2001), also sug-
gest that e¤ort is procyclical, although there is no consensus in the literature
about this.
The model is able to generate a large volatility of unemployment since the
response of the wage to productivity shocks is small. As Shimer (2005) argued, a
highly pro-cyclical wage will absorb part of an increase in productivity, reducing
the incentive for rms to post vacancies and so dampening cyclical movements
in unemployment and vacancies13 . The wage is not highly pro-cyclical in our
model. Following a productivity shock, there is an increase in the annuity value
of unemployment. This leads to an increase in the reference wage and thus to an
increase in the wage. However, from (24), the increase in the reference wage is
only small, since workers understand that transient shocks have only a limited
impact on the income they receive throughout their career. As a consequence,
rms respond to productivity shocks by making large changes to the level of
vacancies they post, but only small changes to the wage. By doing so, they
generate large movements of unemployment across the business cycle14 .
The model is able to generate a large volatility of unemployment even if the
opportunity cost of employment is as strongly pro-cyclical as the evidence in
Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) suggests. This is because the op-
portunity cost a¤ects the wage mainly through its impact on the annuity value
of unemployment. The cyclicality of the opportunity cost has only a limited
impact on the annuity value of unemployment since any uctuations in the op-
portunity cost have only a temporary e¤ect on the expected lifetime earnings
of a currently unemployed worker15 . Our model is therefore immune to the C-
R&K critique16 . This is because the opportunity cost a¤ects the wage mainly
13 In our model, the dampening e¤ect of higher wages on vacancy creation is stronger than
the stimulus to vacancy creation that comes from procyclical e¤ort. However, the behavioural
aspects of the model imply that our model requires less wage rigidity than the standard search
frictions models to match the volatility in the data.
14The model is less able to generate a large volatility of unemployment if wages are set
through worker-rm bargaining rather than through wage-posting by the rm. With wage
bargaining, the wage is chosen to maximise 
t = (Lt   Ut)J1 t , where  is the workers
relative bargaining power. The optimality condition is Jt
@(Lt Ut)
@wt
+(1 )(Lt Ut) @Jt@wt = 0.
Since e¤ort is endogenous, @Jt
@wt
= @yt
@wt
  1. Compared to the standard search frictions
model, the negative impact of higher wages is o¤set by an increase in output. Since Jt =
(1  )(1  @yt
@wt
)(Lt  Ut), we obtain (Lt  Ut) = tSt, where t = 
1 (1 ) @yt
@wt
is the share
of the surplus from a job match accruing to the worker. Since t > , workers obtain a larger
size of the surplus from the job match when there are e¤ort e¤ects. Since the inuence of
cyclical labour market conditions on the wage is higher when workers obtain a larger share
of the surplus, this implies that the wage will be more volatile under wage bargaining than
under wage posting. Therefore a model with wage bargaining will be less able to generate a
large volatility of unemployment than a model with wage posting.
15 It would be possible to obtain a similar result using an ad hoc reduced form expression
for the reference wage in which the role of the opportunity cost of employment is supressed.
16The model would not be immune from the critique if the wage were set through the
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through its impact on the annuity value of unemployment. Cyclicality of the
opportunity cost has only a limited impact on the annuity value of unemploy-
ment since uctuations in the opportunity cost are only temporary and so have
only a limited e¤ect on an unemployed workers expected lifetime earnings. Our
model is therefore immune to the C-R&K critique.
3 Simulation Results
In this section we present simulation evidence to complement the analysis in
previous sections. We calibrate the model, as discussed below. The model
comprisises the production function in (3), the optimality condition in (8), the
equations for labour market dynamics in (9)-(13), the e¤ort function in (16),
the wage equation in (23) and the exogenous process generating productivity
shocks. This model is linearised and solved numerically; it is then simulated
and key statistics generated.
3.1 Calibration Strategy
The key parameter of the behavioural search component of our model is the
elasticity of the e¤ort function, . To calibrate this we use estimates of an
e¤ort function similar to (16) in Della Vigna and Pope (2018). Della Vigna and
Pope (2018) use data on the behaviour of 10,000 participants in an experiment
using the Mechanical Turk platform. They estimate a very low elasticity of the
e¤ort function. Based on their estimates, we calibrate  = 0:02. From (16),
the implies that ' is much larger than , so the marginal disutility of e¤ort is
much larger than the marginal benet from reciprocation. We follow Danthine
and Kurmann (2010) in setting the elasticity of d(et) to 1 +  = 0:75; this
implies  =  0:25. These calibrated values for , and  imply ' = 49:75. We
set ! = 0:755 and  = 0:0093 to ensure labour productivity equals unity in
steady-state; our results are not sensitive to the specic values chosen17 .
We calibrate the remaining structural parameters to ensure that our model
matches the rst moments and other key features of US data; we do not calibrate
parameters in order to ensure that the simulated volatilities implied by our
model match the data. In this we di¤er from Hall and Milgrom (2008) and
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) who respectively calibrate the probability of
strategic bargaining approach of Hall and Milgrom (2008). In that case, the wage can be
approximated as the implicit function
wt =
1
2
[y(e(wt)) + bt + ! + c(e(wt)) R(e(wt); wt)]
where e¤ort is given by (16) and ! is the cost to the rm of a disagreement in bargaining.
The model is able to generate a large volatility of unemployment if the opportunity cost of
employment is xed. However it is not able to do so if the opportunity cost is strongly pro-
cyclical as the wage is then pro-cyclical, dampening the incentive of rms to post vacancies
(Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis, 2016).
17With this calibration, the utility cost of e¤ort and the utility benets of reciprocation are
equal to 1:5% and 1:2% respectively of output in steady-state.
14
wage negotiations breaking down and the opportunity cost of employment to
match observed unemployment volatility. We normalize a time period to be
one month. We calibrate s and s to match the persistence and volatility of
US productivity growth for 1951-2004 as reported in Hagedorn and Mankovskii
(2008); this gives s = 0:765 and s = 0:0084. We target u = 0:059; the
average value of the US unemployment rate, 1948-2016. We also target  =
0:72, in steady-state, the value for average labour market tightness reported by
Pissarides (2009). The discount rate is set as r = 0:42%, equivalent to an annual
discount rate of 5%. The average monthly job separation rate is  = 0:03618 .
Since fu = (1   u), our values for  and u imply the average job-nding
rate is f = 0:576; this is close to Shimer (2012)s estimate of f = 0:594. We
follow Hall and Milgrom (2008) and assume that the average opportunity cost
of employment is z = 0:71. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarounis (2016) report
a range of empirical estimates of the opportunity cost of employment, between
0.47 and 0.96, based on alternative specications of the ow value of non-work;
the mid-point of this range is also z = 0:71. For the matching function, we set
 = 0:4; this is the mid-point of the range of estimates obtained by Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001). We calibrate  so that the model matches  = 0:72, in
steady-state. This gives  = 0:38; this value lies in the range of calibrated values
of  in the literature19 . We then calibratem to satisfy the relationship f = m;
this impliesm = 0:70. Our calibrated parameter values are summarised in Table
1).
Table 1 Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value
s Persistence of Supply Shock 0:765
s Volatility of Supply Shock 0:0084
 Separation Rate 0:036
r Discount Rate 0:0042
z Average Opportunity Cost of Employment 0:71
 Vacancy Cost 0:38
m Matching Coe¢ cient 0:7
 Matching Elasticity 0:4
 Elasticity of e(:) 0:02
 Elasticity of d(:) 49:74
' Elasticity of c(:)  0:25
! Cost of E¤ort Function 0:755
 Reciprocity Function 0:0093
 Production Function 1:092
Source: Authorscalculations
18 In the literature, monthly values of  vary between 0.03 (Hall and Milgrom, 2008) and
0.036 (Pissarides, 2009).
19The value of  is contentious. Shimer (2005) uses a quarterly vacancy cost of 0.213.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) use a weekly vacancy cost of 0:584. Hall (2005) assumes a
monthly cost of 0:986 while Pissarides (2009) assumes 0:356.
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As Table 2) shows, we are able to match our calibration targets closely. Being
able to do so using standard calibrations of the non-behavioural parameters of
the model suggests that adding behavioural e¤ects to an otherwise standard
search frictions model does not distort the rest of the model. In particular,
calibrating  using the small estimated value in Della Vigna and Pope (2018)
enables the model to match the data moments in Table 2).
Table 2 Values of Endogenous Variables for Calibration
Parameter Interpretation U.S Data This Paper
 Labour Market Tightness 0:72 0:72
u Unemployment Rate 0:059 0:059
Source: Authorscalculations; the average US unemployment rate is from the
BLS; average tightness is from Pissarides (2009)
3.2 Simulation Results
We assess our models through their ability to match the volatilities of unem-
ployment, labour market tightness and vacancies and the correlations between
unemployment and vacancies and between unemployment and labour market
tightness, as reported by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) for the US, 1951-
2004. These are detailed in the panel a) of Table 3). Panel b) of Table 3)
presents our simulation results in the case where the opportunty cost of em-
ployment is constant. We obtain large volatilities for unemployment, vacancies
and labour market tightness, substantially larger than the volatilities of the un-
derlying shocks. The volatilities of unemployment and labour market tightness
are close to the values in panel a); the volatility of vacancies is somewhat larger
than the target. The autocorrelations are also large, although for vacancies and
labour market tightness they are slightly lower than in the data. The model
generates a large negative Beveridge Curve correlation between unemployment
and vacancies, although this is not as strong as in the data; the correlations be-
tween unemployment and labour market tightness and between vacancies and
labour market tightness are also large and close to the values observed in the
data20 . Panel c) of Table 3) presents results for the case where the opportu-
nity cost of employment is pro-cyclical and z is proportional to s, in line with
Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016)21 . The results are similar to panel
b), with large volatilities for unemployment, vacancies, labour market tightnes
and with similar correlations between the variables.
20The simulated correlations between productivity shocks and unemployment and vacancies
are larger than the correlations observed in the data; this is a well-known shortcoming of search
frictions models, see Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), and suggests a wider range of potential
shocks might be considered
21Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) nd that the elasticity of the cyclical compo-
nent of zt with respect to the cyclical component of the marginal product of labour exceeds
0:8 and in many specications is close to unity.
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Table 3 Simulation Results
Panel a) H&M (2008)s Summary Statistics, US Data, 1951-2004
u v  s
Standard Deviation 0:125 0:139 0:259 0:013
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0:870 0:904 0:896 0:765
u 1  0:919  0:977  0:302
Correlation Matrix v  1 0:982 0:460
   1 0:393
s 1
Panel b) Simulation results with constant z
u v  s
Standard Deviation 0:116 0:157 0:253 0:013
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0:938 0:590 0:765 0:765
u 1  0:698  0:895  0:845
Correlation Matrix v 1 0:895 0:944
 1 1
s 1
Panel c) Simulation results with cyclical z
u v  s
Standard Deviation 0:116 0:157 0:252 0:013
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0:938 0:590 0:765 0:765
u 1  0:698  0:894  0:844
Correlation Matrix v 1 0:895 0:944
 1 1
s 1
Source: Authorscalculations; panel (a) is from Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008)
The results in Panel b) show that a model that incorporates behavioural
features can match the main features of post-war US labour market data if the
opportunity cost of employment is constant. One might view this as merely an
addition to the list of models that can do this, albeit one with solid empirical
support. However, existing models cannot match the data if the opportunity
cost of employment is cyclical, as the estimates in Chodorow-Reich and Karabar-
bounis (2016) suggest it is. As panel c) of Table 3) shows, the main contribution
of our paper is that our model can match the data even when the opportunity
cost of employment is highly cyclical. Thus our model is immune from the cri-
tique of the existing literature advanced in Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis
(2016). As things stand, no other model can claim this.
Comparison of Panels b) and c) of Table 3) shows that cyclical uctuations in
the opportunity cost of employment have very little impact on our results. To see
why, we note that a temporary productivity shock that increases the opportunity
cost leads to only a small increase in the reference wage, as the transient shock
has only a small impact on the annuity value of unemployment, dened in (2).
As a consequence, cyclicality of the opportunity cost of employment adds little
to the response of the wage to a productivity shock, explaining the similarity of
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the results in Panels b) and c) of Table 3). However, we note the opportunity
cost still plays a key role in wage determination and therefore in determining
equilibrium unemployment. Consider a permanent shock which increases the
opportunity cost of employment from 0.71 to 0.81. The permanent increase
in the opportunity cost leads to a large increase in the reference wage and,
through this, to a large increase in the wage. This implies a large increase in
the equilibrium rate of unemployment, from 0.055 to 0.083.
Figure 1) illustrates the mechanisms underlying our model by presenting the
impulse response functions in the case where the opportunity cost of employment
is cyclical. Following a positive productivity shock, rms post more vacancies.
So there is an increase in the job nding rate. As discussed above, the increase
in the opportunity cost and the job nding rate leads to a small increase in the
reference wage, which in turn leads to a small increase in the wage. Although
the increase in the wage is small, it is larger than the increase in the reference
wage; this is largely due to an increase in marginal hiring costs. The increase
in the wage relative to the reference wage leads to an increase in e¤ort. The
small increase in the wage, together with the increase in e¤ort, implies a large
increase in vacancies. This results in a large fall in unemployment. These latter
two e¤ects cause a large increase in labour market tightness which in turn drives
the large increases in the job nding rate and in marginal hiring costs.
4 Conclusions
Currently, all models in the literature that are able to match the observed volatil-
ities, correlations and autocorrelations of unemployment, vacancies and labour
market tightness in US data assume that the opportunity cost of labour is con-
stant. Evidence in Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) that the oppor-
tunity cost of employment is in fact strongly procyclical undermines the ability
of these models to match the data. In this paper, we propose a model that can
match the data while being immune from the Chodorow-Reich and Karabar-
bounis critique. We do this by incorporating insights from behavioural eco-
nomics into the standard search frictions model developed by Diamond (1982),
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000). This results in a model
in which output depends on e¤ort exerted by workers and where rms post
wages in order to elicit the optimal supply of e¤ort from their workforce.
The model is able to match the oberved volatilities of unemployment and
vacancies in US data. Intuitively, this is because rms respond to a positive
productivity shock by posting more vacancies; this leads to a fall in unemploy-
ment. The behavioural elements introduced by our model reinforce this familiar
mechanism. The increase in vacancies and the fall in unemployment leads the
rm to increase the wage so as to increase e¤ort, increasing output along the
intensive margin. This increase in e¤ort increases the incentive of rms to post
vacancies and so the e¤ort e¤ect amplies cyclical movements in unemployment
compared to the standard search frictions model. This mechanism operates even
if the opportunity cost of employment is strongly pro-cyclical. This is because
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the opportunity cost a¤ects the wage through its impact on the annuity value
of unemployment. This e¤ect is only small as shocks to the opportunity cost of
employment have only a limited impact on the annuity value of unemployment,
since workers understand that transient shocks have only a limited impact on
the income they receive throughout their career.
We might develop our analysis by investigating whether the model has ex-
planatory power beyond the average characteristics of the US labour market.
There are two aspects to this. First, we can analyse the performance of the
model in di¤erent environments, for example in the European labour market
where the vacancy-lling rate is lower than in the US. Doing so has proved a
challenge for existing models of search frictions (eg Amaral and Tasci, 2016).
Second, we might use our model to address the changes in the cyclicality of
the US and other labour markets that have been identied by, among others,
Gali and van Rens (2014), in which the volatility of employment and wages has
increased. An analysis based around the incentives of workers to supply e¤ort
may well be able to contribute to this debate.
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Figure 1)
Impulse Response Functions
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